With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783

Matthew H. Spring. With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. Xxiv + 381 ppg. Review by Jimmy Dick Matthew Spring has expanded his doctoral dissertation into a full length book and in the process debunked many fallacies about how the British Army operated in North America during the American Revolution. He drew upon the writings of the officers from both sides of the war as well as diaries and letters of the enlisted men, and those of the Hessians who served under the British flag. In Spring’s pages, the visual concept of perfect rows of British soldiers marching over open fields to engage the Continental Army is pushed aside in favor of what actually took place; British troops advancing in skirmish lines across terrain that was broken by fences, brush, and heavily wooded areas. The British Army’s reliance on shock tactics including the famed bayonet charge were usually effective, but over time as the Continental Army gained experience and used the terrain to their advantage these tactics failed. Still, the British Army won most of the Revolution’s battles but failed to win the war due to strategic and logistical problems presented by the sheer size of the colonies. In addition, the political factors brought about by France entering the war decreased the manpower available to the British generals who begged for more troops throughout the war. Spring’s chapters explore how the British maneuvered, their formations, their units, and how the men were recruited and organized. The book could have used more detailed information on the actual units, the campaigns and battles they fought in, and the weaponry involved beyond the basic arms. Still, it gives a fascinating explanation of the British Army that shatters the misconceptions held by many. The facts were that the British soldier fought extremely well and with great pride throughout the war. The soldiers themselves fought in different manners depending on units, but were let down by the lack of resources needed to exploit their battlefield victories while being unable to replace losses late in the war. The image Spring leaves with the reader is one of a proud seasoned British veteran that fought in North America as part of a professional army. Illustrations by Don Troiani add to that image. The book is well written and organized by topic into each chapter which allows the reader to move through the pages by subject conveniently. Tactics, military organization, logistics, and the use of the bayonet as well as both small arms and artillery are explained in their corresponding chapters. His use of supporting statistics serves to add to the information and expands the topic rather than overwhelm the reader with a plethora of numbers. Spring takes the time to explain how the British regiments recruited their men in the Home Isles, trained them, and sent them into the ranks of the parent units in North America. He also devotes a chapter to the leadership of the regiments and how those officers were instrumental on the battlefield in rallying broken units while also employing intelligent small unit tactics to counter the Continental Army’s bushfighting strategy. In addition he explains why the British failed to defeat the Continentals. When the British and Americans clashed in major set piece battles the British carried the day almost every time, but from the very beginning the British commanders were hamstrung by their lack of numbers needed to defeat the Continentals and pacify the countryside. At no time did they have enough men to meet the political goals of the British Parliament. When France and Spain entered the war on the American side and expanded the conflict into a truly global war the British Army in the North American colonies was cut in half. The West Indies were considered far more valuable than the thirteen American colonies and substantial numbers of troops were redeployed from the force in North America in order to protect the island colonies from French and Spanish depredations. Generally Spring does not go into much detail beyond the strategic military situation of the forces fighting in North America, however to explain the situation so that the reader will understand why the rebellion succeeded he had to outline the handicaps which the British fought under during the conflict. The British attempt to use military force to resolve a political dispute in this manner strongly implies that most members of Parliament as well as the King and his advisors failed to understand the logistical issues as well as the sheer size of the colonies. There is no question that the British Army was by far and above superior to the forces the Americans had, but due to the failure of Parliament to create a force large enough to meet its goals most British victories ended up being Pyrrhic as they could ill afford to lose any substantial number of men. It was this failure that Spring concludes was the primary reason behind the success of American Independence to overcome the better quality British troops. All in all the book is a refreshing challenge to the hoary tales of British troops marching into sheets of American firepower ignoring their losses until they finally met into close combat. Instead, the reader is left imagining the British troops using the terrain as cover, employing light infantry to skirmish with and distract the Americans, while quickly closing with the Americans in their defensive positions and often causing the Continental lines to break in fear. In other words, the British Army has been given back its status of the preeminent fighting machine of its day.

This is an outstanding work and should be on the bookshelf of anyone with an interest in the War of the American Revolution, specifically the British Army. This is a very intresting volume, for while it can be considered an `academic history' (and those are usually very expensive, which this book is not, and don't usually discuss the necessary `marching and killing' that is at the center of military history, this one does), the author makes a very interesting statement regarding the writing and content of the volume:`Over the past few decades, academic historians (especially Americans) of the American War and its contending armies have written a great deal on topics such as strategic planning, logistics, and social history. Yet if the ultimate purpose of all armies is to fight, and if therefore the most fundamental task facing the military historian is arguably to study combat, it is perhaps ironic that we should still have relatively little detailed analysis of the war in which the respective armies operated on campaign and in action.'This book admirably fills that perceived void, and it is this volume, which is a tremendous study of the British Army of the period, that sets the standard for future works of this type. It ranks as one of the best volumes on the military history of what the author refers to as `the American war.'The text does not merely cover the tactics, (which includes the British `bayonet charge' and `bushfighting'), firepower, but the British soldier's motivation, battles, as well as, among others, what the British Army in North America was assigned to accomplish, and the `operational constraints' that army faced.The text also addresses the enemy of the British Army, first, the American Continental Army, which the author contends, correctly, `was the foremost obstacle to the restoration of British authority in the colonies. The American militia and its inherent problems is also covered very well, stating that on the open battlefield the militia did not perform well, but could in broken and wooded country, but that its most value was in serving the United States as an armed constabulary of police force.The author dispels many myths about the British Army in North America, along with many about the American militia, and that the militia, if faced with disaster, as after the lost battle of Camden in August 1780, would turn coat against the Americans and side with the British. The only conclusion that can be reached is that the `traditional' viewpoint of the militia as performing the yeoman work against the British in the field is not only incorrect, but is a gross exaggeration.The army the British fielded in North America was not only, in 1776, the largest expeditionary force that ever proceded from Great Britain, but it was also an excellent army, even though a significant portion of its combat power was provided by minor German princes. The quality of the British troops was excellent, as were the Germans that fought shoulder to shoulder with them against the Americans. It is also largely an unrecognized army, and there are no British regimental battle honors recognizing their excellent service, and that is a long-uncorrected oversight. They fought excellently in a losing cause that was not of their making and they left a legacy of a string of hard-fought actions, most of them victories, far from home.

When I purchased this book I thought I would be getting the British Army's version of Ian Toll's masterful Six Frigates, in that it would be a chronological history of the British Army in America interspersed with character sketches and observations of British weaponry, tactics, and doctrine. This book did not deliver, and I was a little disappointed. Then I started to give the book a second chance.Boy, am I glad I did. I didn't get the story I was hoping for, but I got a treasure trove of useful information. I learned a whole lot about the King's forces during the War for Independence, such as:---Officers carried muskets, tried to wear as little ornamentation that would tell them apart from their troops, and traveled light (no fancy silver service, just a book and a change of clothes---Troops did not march in close order as on the flat plains of Flanders, Germany and Spain , but in a very loose order well-suited for thick woods---Colors and music were carried into actual battle very sporadically---And much more.One thing I wished the book had dealt with a bit more was the cavalry aspect of the King's Troops. Given that Tarleton's British Legion was predominantly a cavalry force and that the book's own front cover shows American cavalryman Col. William Washington fighting Loyalist foot, I would have expected a bit more than the book's "the absence of cavalry meant that British generals could not pursue the enemy even if they won the field."Still, very nice. Gives me lots of stuff to watch out for when I decide to sit down and watch The Patriot

What a pleasure it is to encounter a book on the AWI which is free of obvious biases and which uses the sources to try to extract the historical answer to historical questions. Every factor of the British Army's response is considered carefully and this consideration will carry over into your reading of other books on the period. Although the topic is the British Army, the Loyalist, Continental, State and militia forces appear in strength and are treated not as some amusing example of dogs walking or women preaching, but of different styles of war-fighting. If you are looking for polemics this is a damned bad book. If you are looking for a balanced view to help to inform your own opinion I can think of no finer work.

This is an excellent study, every page a fascinating and objective examination of the nuts and bolts of Revolutionary warfare from the British perspective. It is impossible to read this book and not come away with a clear picture of how the British Army actually fought in North America. I hope it is read, learned and inwardly digested by any pundit planning to write, lecture of pontificate on the subject, not least scriptwriters, film directors and Australian actors. It deserves to be and needs to be. Very highly recommended.

A superb bit of writing, by far the best work I have read on the British Army in the AWI. The author is clear and concise in his writing but the language is fluid and engaging. He covers all aspects of the army including tactics and organisation, morale, motivation. A must for your AWI library.

A good buy well written reflecting the "bad guys" in the American war for independence perhaps American entanglements in peace keeping situations is changing the way they see history at last.

A simply splendid overview of the trials and tribulations of conducting a war months away from the home nation. I wish I had bought it sooner.