Diplomacy (Touchstone Book)

Diplomacy by Henry KissingerSimon and Schuster, 1994912 pages.In his capacity as both the National Security Advisor and as the Secretary of State for two different presidents Henry Kissinger redefined the nature and scope of American diplomacy. He served in the most tumultuous administration of the twentieth century yet managed to invigorate foreign policy in what was also the nadir of executive prestige. With Richard Nixon he formulated a grand strategy based on the twin principles of Wilsonian idealism and European realpolitik that led to a period of geopolitical stability in the midst of America's extrication from the Vietnam quagmire. The Nixon-Kissinger team reshaped the nature of Soviet-American relations and introduced a period of détente using triangular diplomacy and the concept of linkage. As both an academic and as a practitioner of the art, Kissinger describes in his book the evolution and philosophical heritage of American diplomacy and its impact on global and regional stability during its rapid ascendancy as a superpower in the twentieth century. Kissinger provides both the casual reader and the foreign policy maven a refreshing history of American foreign policy as a reflection of its uniquely benign belief in its own exceptionalism.In Diplomacy Kissinger lists two primary schools of thought that govern the conduct and define the characteristics of foreign policy. European diplomacy in its current form traces its roots to Cardinal Richelieu and the primacy of the state. Raison d'etat radically altered international relations because it provided the philosophical justification towards the secularization of national interest. No longer under the suffocating aegis of the church, nations shrugged off idealistic endeavors in favor of policies that provided tangible benefits. The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the modern state system and ushered in a tumultuous period due to the lack of a confluence of common interests and a shared system of values in the concert of nations. Following the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars Metternich presided over a period of relative stability in Europe by positioning the decaying Austrian Empire as the fulcrum of the European balance of power. In his relentless pursuit towards the creation of a unified Germany, Bismarck dispensed with incremental gains and boldly asserted Prussian hegemony with a series of wars buttressed by peace settlements that consolidated his gains. Bismarck unhinged the Vienna settlement and dealt the existing balance a mortal blow. The cold calculus of raw power supplanted the Metternich consensus of legitimacy and in the wake of the entangling system of alliances that ensued, a European conflagration became almost inevitable. Indeed the singular practice of realpolitik, Kissinger asserts, "turned on itself" .Whereas realpolitik was distilled from the crucible of armed conflict, Wilsonian idealism reflected the triumphs of democracy and manifest destiny, together with the unshakeable belief in the exportability of the uniquely American system of values. While Kissinger lauds the style and substance of American diplomacy he nonetheless insists on the exercise of restraint governed by the realization of American national interest. According to Kissinger the most successful American statesmen were those capable of blending Wilsonian idealism with realpolitik. While Wilson provided the conceptual basis for American foreign policy in its ascendancy as a great power, he was unable to realize his objectives. A generation later, Roosevelt, borrowing heavily from Wilson's Fourteen Points, co-authored the Atlantic Charter and provided the framework for the United Nations. Roosevelt was successful because he possessed a surer grasp of the tenor of national consensus. He advanced Wilson's idealism and accepted the responsibilities of great power status yet accepted the territorial aggrandizement of the Soviet Union. The nation that implemented the Marshall Plan and sponsored the economic recovery of its former enemies was the same nation that unleashed weapons of unprecedented destructiveness on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.Kissinger's analysis of American diplomacy during the Cold War is particularly noteworthy. From the prescient George Kennan to the equally remarkable Ronald Reagan, Kissinger chronicles the evolution of American strategies of containment. As a statesman he refrains from the insensitive criticism of an academic, and as an academic he bases his analysis on research rather than a political or personal agenda. Kissinger traces the theoretical origins of Cold War diplomacy in the Truman administration through its first tests in Greece and Turkey and armed intervention in Korea. He clarifies the persisting debate on Vietnam and rather than vilifying a single administration as is the popular pastime of many historians, he traces the efforts of four separate presidents and nearly twenty years of American involvement. It is remarkable, however, that Kissinger merely brushes over an event as significant as the Cuban missile crisis.Although Kissinger devotes the majority of his book to American diplomacy, he evaluates the actions of both allies and adversaries and their respective impact on the geopolitical environment. He supports Kennan's thesis that the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable but credits American diplomacy with limiting Soviet aggression and containing communist infiltration in regions vital to American interests.American diplomacy, Kissinger asserts, is the product of American exceptionalism and democratic necessity. Lacking the unifying force of an opposing superpower, the United States may again fall victim to the siren song of isolationism. Kissinger devotes the final pages of his book to a call for the development of a national interest. National interest will undoubtedly combine elements of realpolitik and Wilsonian idealism and define limits in order to prevent the exhaustion of American will and an overextension of American capabilities. National interest will also provide the requisites for unilateral action in a world increasingly suspicious of the military, economic, and cultural domination of the sole superpower. The current outlook is not auspicious. Western Europe, for the most part a steadfast ally during the Cold War, is breaking ranks and currently one of the most vociferous critics of American foreign policy. Future administrations face new challenges in an increasingly complicated new world order where simple geopolitical calculations are rendered useless and threats to American security span continents in the form of decentralized terrorist cells. However, America has answered challenges to the Wilsonian goals of peace, stability, progress, and freedom for mankind with resolve and moral conviction in the twentieth century. And though it may be a "journey that has no end," Kissinger's faith in the purpose and goals of American diplomacy remains unshakable.

If I could give Kissinger's Diplomacy 10 stars, I certainly would. This book is extremely well written. I was amazed at how well Henry Kissinger explained 300 years of Western history and diplomacy. Because the book is so well written, I would recommend it to folks interested in history, political science, international relations, or for just interesting reading of a good book.I found the early chapter on Woodrow Wilson's approach to American exceptionalism, which included our native idealism, collaborative successes, and mutual security and multilateral action in international affairs to be very insightful and Kissinger returns to these concepts again and again in his analysis of statescraft. Likewise in this early chapter he contrasts Wilson to Theodore Roosevelt's philosophy of action only with clear national interests in mind, a world of realpolitik. He also explains balance of power approaches and adequately demonstrated the barriers, benefits, consequences, and downside of each of these approaches. After reading this 800 page book, I am ready to sit down and start reading again. It is really that good.There are numerous highlights but I will share a few with you.His chapter on Richelieu and Louis XIV demonstrated how Richelieu created the first modern state to emerge from the Middle Ages. Richelieu acted to consolidate power for the French king which ran counter to the mind set of the Middle Ages. Unfortunatley, as Kissinger demonstrates, Louis XIV squanders this power with needless wars, for which his relative Louis XVI paid the ultimate price.One section of the book, regarding the Concert of Europe after the fall of Napoleon, reveals statescraft at the heights. Metternich and Talleyrand helped create a peace that lasted over 100 years based on realistic balance of power and alliances based on common values.The development of the German state under the power of Bismark compared to the downfall of France under Napoleon III was very interesting. Unfortunately the power of the new German state was misused in World War I.The sections on World War I demonstrated the pattern by which military decisions and preparedness outweigh and preceed correcting diplomacy. In this section Kissinger and Tuchman offer a common view of the origins of World War I.Kissinger and Tuchman however diverge when it comes to Vietnam. Tuckman's short crisp summary of the tragedy of Vietnam in her book The March of Folley is a very good summary, but Kissinger's chapters on Vietnam in Diplomacy certainly put meat on the bones of fact.Finally Kissinger's analysis of his years working with Richard Nixon were real eye-openers. Richard Nixon undoubtedly had considerable gifts in the area of foreign policy which makes the tragedy of Watergate even more sad.I just do not think anyone with half a brain would be dissatisfied with this excellent book.

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